The Origins of the First World War: Controversies and Consensus (Making History)

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Well the most recent interpretations on the origins of the war focus on Russia and France in particular and also Serbia’s role has been highlighted – I’m thinking here of Christopher Clark’s book The Sleepwalkers, which has already made quite a splash and he’s looked at a lot of archival evidence to show for example Serbia’s involvement, to prove Serbia’s involvement in the assassination and to highlight the roles played by France and Russia; and Sean McMeekin is another example of somebody who highlights Russia’s culpability in the outbreak of the war. I wonder what your view is on the idea that Europe sleepwalked into war in 1914. That suggests to me that nobody actually wanted it and the war really was an accident.

The German Reich was not “guilty” of World War I. Such a category did not exist then, for, according to the code of European state wars, sovereign states had the “ ius ad bellum” as long as they could claim a violation of their interests. In 1914, this right to war applied least to Great Britain because the United Kingdom could not claim an immediate interest of coalition obligation for an intervention in a local war (between Austria-Hungary and Serbia). Only the British entry into the war turned the original conflict into a global disaster. Footnote 114 Historians of the Great War found themselves in high demand in 2014. The looming anniversary naturally prompted publishers to commission titles that were designed to make a splash, cause debate, and spark public interest. The market was consequently flooded with publications that attempted to explain why war had broken out in 1914. Few could have predicted, however, the full extent of public and media interest in World War I. Nor could one have expected that the question of the origins of the war, in particular, would once again be paramount and the subject of widespread, heated debate.

Guilt or Responsibility? The Hundred Year Debate on the Origins of the First World War (2015-12-31) Annika Mombauer's essential source reader translates, cross-references and annotates a vast range of international diplomatic and military documents on the origins of the First World War. It collects together documents which are newly discovered or were not previously available in English, drawn from a broad range of sources and countries into a single, indispensible text for students and scholars alike.

In this audio you will be able to hear two leading historians of the First World War discuss their subject with me, Annika Mombauer. We’ll be hearing from Professor John Röhl and Professor Christopher Clark, who’ll both be able to tell us why this is such a fascinating subject; why this is such a difficult debate; and what the role of evidence – in particular – is in helping historians come to conclusion, quite different conclusions, about the origins of the First World War. The Kaiser. New Research on Wilhelm II’s role in Imperial Germany, Cambridge University Press, 2003 (edited with Wilhelm Deist) Find out more about this book Clearly, then, some important areas of consensus do exist. But disagreements on nuance and detail continue unabated, and here the devil is in the detail. Historians reading the same evidence come to opposing conclusions or evaluate the importance of specific events in an entirely different way. For example, they continue to argue over the significance of Austria-Hungary's declaration of war on Serbia, the importance of the Russian mobilization, as well as about the nature of, and intention behind, the British mediation proposals. In fact, the most recent publications spend a great deal of time considering these controversial aspects in particular. Introduction: The Fischer Controversy 50 years on’, The Journal of Contemporary History April 2013 48 (2), pp.231-240 This is not the only area in which the book makes some interesting contributions to existing debates. Despite the fact that the title suggests that the scope of the work is confined to the origins of the war, the study actually continues into the early war years. Thus, in addition to assessing Moltke's contribution to the military outcome to the July Crisis, Dr Mombauer also evaluates his part in the failure of the so-called Schlieffen plan. This is, of course, an old controversy, but Dr Mombauer is, nevertheless, able to bring a genuinely fresh eye to it. Starting from the premise that there was a Schlieffen plan, Terrance Zuber's recent claims notwithstanding (4) that it was Moltke's job to update this plan on a regular basis, that his revisions made sense in the light of the changing circumstances of the European military scene, and that Moltke's actions reflected the fact that he was not a victim of the 'short war illusion', she is able to provide a more balanced perspective to the German reverse at the Marne. This result, which played a major part in ensuring that the First World War would be a prolonged 'total war', was in many respects the culmination of all of Moltke's fears. Once again, however, this fact merely serves to place his actions in pushing so strenuously for war into the sharpest relief.Until recently, most historians would have agreed that, in 1914, Britain had no foreign policy aims and ambitions on the continent, other than to preserve the balance of power, ensure the safety of the Empire, and remain on good terms with its Entente partners. Footnote 26 However, in his study of British foreign policy before the war, Andreas Rose casts doubt on Britain's alleged peaceful inclination and concludes that the German threat was largely an invention that suited Britain's decision-makers in their pursuit of a pro-Russian agenda. Footnote 27 While Germany was, “without question,” observed with mistrust from London, Rose argues that it was “in the main the fear of the seemingly unassailable Tsarist Empire that made Great Britain shy away from a neutral and conciliatory attitude in 1914.” Footnote 28 My work forms part of secondary teacher professional development in the UK and contributes to secondary school curriculums and textbooks in Germany and the UK. It provides one of many interpretations of the origins of the war (which I happen to think is the right one, but with which not everyone agrees!), enabling pupils and students to evaluate different viewpoints and come to their own conclusions. All upcoming public events are going ahead as planned and you can find more information on our events blog

Also published in Serbian - ISBN 978-86-7102-452-5 and Croatian translation - ISBN 978-953-303-726-4 - with a new foreword, 2014) She would be interested to hear from prospective PhD students wishing to research a topic in modern German or European history. Publications Monographs Why did the assassination of Austro-Hungarian Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 lead to the deaths of millions in a global war of unprecedented scale and ferocity? This question has been the subject of historical, political and public debate for more than 100 years. I think it is wrong to talk about some sort of unique German war guilt, but we have to talk about different and very often interrelated responsibilities. The talk on German war guilt, which was very much influenced by the Versailles Treaty and the interwar period and the argument that Hitler's rise was only possible because of this war guilt....Gerhard Hirschfeld: I don't see parallels. History does not repeat itself. History is, in a way, dependent on certain factors and conditions that are different from what we used to have. There are no parallels between 1914 and 2014. Having said that, there is one element, however, that, I'm afraid, creates continuity and this is the human factor. People do not change. They have the same feelings, emotions, ambitions, strivings for power. So, when it comes to judging the personal factor, the ambitions of politicians, there I would say is an element of continuity. But the historical context changed dramatically. We didn't have a NATO in 1914, we didn't have an OSCE, an EU. We didn't have international organizations and alliances that are controlling elements of a crisis. You have the same emotions, but not the same conditions and historical structures as in the past. Germany’, in Holger Herwig and Richard Hamilton (eds), War Planning 1914, Cambridge University Press, 2010, pp. 48-79 Find out more about this book